In this article I use linguistic fuzzy-set theory to analyze the process of decision making in politics. I first introduce a number of relevant elements of (numerical and linguistic) fuzzy-set theory that are needed to understand the terminology as well as to grasp the scope and depth of the approach. I then explicate a linguistic fuzzy-set approach (LFSA) to the process of decision making under conditions in which the decision makers are required to simultaneously satisfy multiple criteria. The LFSA approach is illustrated through a running (hypothetical) example of a situation in which state leaders need to decide how to combine trust and power to make a choice on security alignment.
Introduction
In this article I present a linguistic fuzzy-set approach to decision making that models how actors who are faced with situations fraught with vagueness make their decisions. I consider situations in which the actors engage in a process of evaluating the merits of different choice alternatives under multiple criteria-a process of multiple criteria decision making. A key question is: how do actors aggregate the vague information that they have on these criteria to reach a final decision on the situation facing them? Drawing on a vast area of research in engineering and other fields of knowledge such as business management and medical research, I propose a linguistic fuzzy-set approach (LFSA) to analyze the process of decision making in international relations and politics under multiple criteria. 1 The approach is ''fuzzy'' because it is built on fuzzy-set theory. It is also linguistic because it uses ''words'' as computational variables, not numbers. Linguistic fuzzy modeling is a tool for transforming the linguistic description of the empirical world into a mathematical model.
The development of fuzzy logic was motivated in large measure by the need for a conceptual framework that can address the issue of vagueness and lexical imprecision. The theory of fuzzy logic provides a mathematical framework that seeks to capture the vagueness associated with human cognitive processes, such as thinking and reasoning with concepts that are inherently vague and not amenable to boundary delineation (which is the case for most, if not all, human concepts about themselves and the world). Conventional approaches to knowledge representation lack the means for representing the meaning of such fuzzy concepts. In fuzzy logic, exact reasoning is viewed as a limiting case of approximate reasoning. Everything is always a matter of degree and knowledge is thus interpreted as a collection of fuzzy constraints on a collection of fuzzy variables (Zadeh 1992, pp. 2-25) .
A conventional way to study the process of decision making under multiple criteria is to compare the costs and benefits of the possible choices that decision makers face and then conclude that they would opt for the optimal choice. To this effect, practitioners and analysts alike do their best to achieve a very high degree of precision in estimating the variables that are postulated to determine the final choice. This is no easy task, because most conceptual variables are often difficult to operationalize, a problem that equally confronts those inclined to use either qualitative or quantitative methods of analysis. Constantly seeking more conceptual and operational precision and crispness is commonly believed to be a golden rule in the production of high-quality research work in social sciences. Yet we all know that as human beings we are bound to express ourselves in a natural language that uses words. The meanings of words are inherently, as literary critics and others are quick to emphasize, imprecise, vague, and fuzzy.
2 Relying on quantitative methods does not solve this problem for two reasons. First, analysts might fall into the trap of overdoing it, that is, by seeking too much precision and crispness in their methods they would end up sacrificing connection with the ''observed'' phenomenon they are trying to explain. Second, the variables and approaches of these quantitative methods cannot also escape the process of interpretation, which in the end recreates the very condition of imprecision and fuzziness that conventional quantitative methods usually seek to avoid.
This situation is by no means specific to social scientists, though. For example, students of engineering are also confronted with the dilemma that human beings use data analysis for ''reasoning and, more particularly, making rational decisions in an environment of imprecision, uncertainty, and partial truth'' (Zadeh 1999, p. 107) . Such concerns have engendered a whole industry of methodologies called the fuzzy-logic approach and, more prominently, a vast research program organized around the idea of computing with words instead of just numbers. 3 A key element of the approach is that it avoids an unnatural numericalization of knowledge wherein the latter does not emerge naturally. The use of LFSA deals with qualitative aspects that are represented in qualitative terms by means of linguistic variables.
This article is organized into six sections. Section 2 briefly reviews a series of important published works that examine various issues in international relations using a fuzzy-set theoretic approach. My approach is in some sense a continuation of, and provides an improvement to, the method of these works because it builds on these works to use linguistic fuzzy-set theory, not just fuzzy-sets theory. The third section introduces a number of relevant elements of numerical and linguistic fuzzy-set theory that are needed to understand the terminology of the approach as well as to grasp the scope and depth of the approach. Let me emphasize that although both Charles Ragin and I are using fuzzy-set theory, there are two main differences between our approaches. First, Ragin (2000) is interested in using fuzzy-set theoretic tools as a methodology for empirical analysis. My approach seeks to analyze the decision-making process that actors engage in-it is hence a sort of ''heuristics'' of decision (this point will be explored in some depth later in the article). Second, Ragin's approach is based on the use of what is known as ''membership function,'' which is a number. My approach computes with words and does not use membership functions. The fourth section explicates a linguistic fuzzy theory approach to the process of decision making under conditions in which the decision makers are required to simultaneously satisfy multiple criteria, which might be mutually reinforcing or conflicting. The fifth section compares the linguistic fuzzy-set approach to social choice theory. This section hence helps make the case that the linguistic fuzzy-set method can be applied to individual decision making as well as to collective choice situations. The final section concludes by summarizing my main results. Throughout the article I use a hypothetical situation in which state leaders have to decide on the formation of a security alignment by choosing among a set of alternative arrangements based on a set of multiple criteria. This example is meant to be illustrative only, hence I do not claim any empirical ''truth'' to the underlying assumptions or conclusions.
Fuzzy Sets in IR and Social Science
The notion of a fuzzy set, first introduced by Zadeh in 1965 , is based on the idea that an object more or less corresponds to a category. 4 The concept of fuzzy sets focuses on the vagueness that is intrinsic to natural language (e.g., in descriptions such as ''very smart'' person, ''widely used'' terms) and the idea that sets are fuzzy. For example, the set of developing states is fuzzy in the sense that it is both theoretically and empirically impossible to unambiguously and sharply define what a developing state is and where the boundary between the sets of developing and developed states lies. This in fact is true for all state attributes such as democratic, democratizing, failing, consolidating, and so forth. If one were to use conventional ways to describe the set of democratic states, one would say that state A is either democratic or not-it is either a member or not a member of the set of democracies. As most students of democratization will testify, though, this is a very unempirical statement. In reality, states are always more or less democratizing. In other words, state A is more or less in the set of democratic states. The membership value is not necessarily 1 (i.e., ''in'') or 0 (i.e., ''out''), as conventional wisdom based on crisp sets would have it. Rather, the membership value is somewhere between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to completely nondemocratic and 1 corresponding to fully democratic. Dealing with this notion of gradual membership in a fuzzy set has resulted in a rich industry of concepts, theorems, algebras, and the like.
Attaching a degree of membership to the elements in the fuzzy set means that the extent to which an element belongs to the fuzzy set is an element of the continuous interval [0, 1], rather than the Boolean pair f0 (out), 1 (in)g. A classical (crisp) set A is defined as a collection of elements x 2 A, the characteristic function c(x) of which can have one of two values, 0 or 1. A value of 1 means that element x is in set A, whereas a value of 0 means that it is not. The characteristic function of a fuzzy set allows various degrees of membership for the elements of a given set-the elements are included in the set to a 4 For an introductory text on fuzzy-set theory and applications see, for example, Klir and Yuan (1995) . certain extent or degree, with some elements ''more'' included and others ''less'' included. Formally, a fuzzy set A (drawn from a larger set of elements, X) is characterized by a membership function l(.) given by l: X fi [0, 1], and 0 l(x) 1. l (x) represents the degree to which x belongs to A. Compared with a crisp subset of X, the range of the membership function of a fuzzy set is a continuous mapping over the interval [0, 1] , rather than the two-element set f0, 1g.
For example, in a fuzzy Prisoner's Dilemma game, the strategy of cooperation can be divided into a number of fuzzy sets (subcategories) described as full cooperation, strong cooperation, moderate cooperation, weak cooperation, and no cooperation, with the corresponding membership functions given respectively by l
, and l C N . These are continuous functions on the interval [0, 1], which means that the players are more or less fully cooperating, more or less moderately cooperating, etc. Probability and statistics are insufficient to represent this sort of linguistically represented vagueness.
5 Fuzzy-set theory is a tool that allows us to mathematically incorporate such an inherent vagueness in decision theory. More generally, as Ragin (2000, p. 331 ) noted, ''Paradoxically, fuzzy sets highlight the imprecision of social scientific concepts and demand that they be sharpened and clarified. The greater the correspondence between the scores indexing membership in a fuzzy set, on the one hand, and the meaning of the concept that parallels the set, on the other, the more useful the fuzzy set. . . . to construct a fuzzy set and assign fuzzy membership scores, researchers must say what their concepts mean, and they must be explicit about membership criteria. '' In a groundbreaking piece, C. A. Cioffi-Revilla (1981, p. 129) sought to systematically introduce the ideas and concepts of fuzzy-sets theory to the IR discipline. His goal was to show how ''the ambiguity and uncertainty which are inherent in many historical alliances, decisions, and perceptions of international relations'' are not the result of ''random factors, unreliable quantitative data, and inaccurate measurement.'' He thus sought to highlight the potential for fuzzy-sets theory to calculate and analyze fuzzy phenomena in IR for purposes of modeling and theory building. Although this piece did not per se go far in actually formulating fuzzy-set theories of IR, it should be credited for alerting the IR readership to the potential power of fuzzy sets in addressing the inherent fuzziness of many IR phenomena and concepts. Not only did Cioffi-Revilla clearly present many of the ideas and tools of fuzzy sets as a succinct introduction for the uninitiated reader, he also showed through a variety of IR examples the usefulness, strength, and potential of the approach. As he put it (1981, pp. 157-158) , ''The fuzzy approach can provide the framework within which to develop truly general (although fuzzy) theories, from which current theories can be derived as special cases concerning well-defined classes in the universe of IR.'' This optimistic prognosis has not become a reality, unfortunately. But a number of works have since appeared that do indeed, if only partially, confirm Cioffi-Revilla's expectations.
Most interestingly, G. S. Sanjian (1988 Sanjian ( , 1991 Sanjian ( , 1992 ) published a series of articles in which he formulated fuzzy-set models of decision making in IR. His first piece (1988) presented a model of the decision-making process of U.S. arms trade using fuzzy-set theory. He developed ''a fuzzy set model of the process through which an arms exporting country selects a transfer for a prospective importer '' (1988, p. 1018) . He then presented ''a method for deriving the exporter's optimal strategy in any arms trade setting.'' Finally, he provided an empirical test of the model ''by comparing its ability to predict the policy choices of the United States for Third World importers with the predictive capabilities of two expected-utility models.'' The fuzzy-sets model was able to successfully predict 91% of the cases tested. In addition, the model shows that ''the politically advantageous strategy is always a function of (1) the relative importance of the countries in the import region of the exporter; and (2) the implication of the exporters' strategic options for its relations with those countries '' (1988, p. 1043) . Sanjian concluded that the fuzzy-set model is a good representation of the export patterns of a hegemon. In this respect, the fuzzy-set model performed as well as an expected utility model.
Sanjian elaborated this approach in 1991 to examine the process of arms transfers by the Great Powers. More specifically, he used fuzzy-set theory to model the decisionmaking processes of hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive exporters of arms. Sanjian's fuzzy-set model outperformed rival autoregressive, minimum information, and expectedutility models with an overall success rate of 87% in predicting the exporting strategies of the United States, France, and West Germany to the Third World in the period 1959 -1976 . Sanjian (1991 concluded that ''much of the hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive decision making can be explained with a relatively parsimonious nontraditional formal model.'' He further developed his fuzzy-sets approach to examine the collective decisionmaking processes within NATO, specifically considering the 1989 debates on whether to modernize the alliance's short-range nuclear missiles or negotiate an agreement for force reduction with the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After summarizing the fuzzy-set approach to collective decisions under multiple criteria, Sanjian applied it to the case in point, concluding that the model successfully predicted NATO's adoption of Germany's position on the issue.
The idea of using fuzzy sets in social sciences was given an important boost in 2000 when Ragin published Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Much like Cioffi-Revilla and Sanjian, Ragin sought to explore the utility of fuzzy-set theory as a way to bridge the divide between qualitative and quantitative methods, arguing in this regard that fuzzy-sets theory allows a far richer exchange between ideas and evidence in social research than what the existing methods offer. Ragin uses fuzzy-set theory to refute conventional ''homogenizing assumptions'' of variable-oriented approaches to empirical cases and causality and instead advances an agenda based on diversity-oriented research strategies. Most important, Ragin concisely shows how fuzzy-set theory allows a natural fit between evolving theoretical concepts and in-depth knowledge gained through case studying. Ragin's book is very rich in insights and discussions about a variety of issues that pertain to the discovery process through which fuzzy-set social science evolves. Moreover, he devotes a large portion of the book to exploring the issues of necessary, sufficient, and complex causality from a fuzzy-set perspective. Not only does he show how to ''fuzzify'' our conventional treatments of causality; he also uses real examples from international political economy (such as protests against International Monetary Fund policies) to illustrate how a fuzzy-set approach to causality would perform in empirical testing. 6 Although the IR discipline has yet to fully recognize the potential of fuzzy-set methods for theory formulation and testing, these works clearly make a good case that fuzzy-sets methods are at least as good as many other methods, if not better, as this author believes. Not surprisingly, there are problems with the above works as they apply fuzzy-set theory to social sciences. One key shortcoming is the arbitrariness of the notion of membership function, especially when applied to empirical cases. Although this is not specific to social 6 I recently became aware of some very interesting a work by Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, who build on Ragin's fuzzy-set social science to explore causality in two-level theories. See also Cox (1999). sciences and phenomena, it becomes more important because all of the above-cited works prescribe a core role to membership functions.
Membership functions are generally speaking at the core of many fuzzy-set theories. This prompted many skeptics about the import of fuzzy sets for social sciences to argue that determining the membership function is more or less both theoretically and empirically arbitrary due to two major problems that emerge when using fuzzy sets to theorize about concepts by relying on the notion of membership functions. First, there is no generally agreed-on method to derive or calculate membership functions, from either first principles or empirical data. Second, uncertainty and vagueness can also occur in the membership functions themselves. The degrees of membership to a category can also become fuzzy sets themselves, leading to the concept of type 2 fuzzy numbers whose memberships are fuzzy sets. The transition from ordinary crisp sets to type 1 fuzzy sets is done when we cannot determine the membership of an element in a set as either 0 or 1, that is, when the membership becomes any number between 0 and 1. Similarly, when the circumstances are so imprecise and fuzzy that we have trouble determining the membership degree as a crisp number in the interval [0, 1], we can move to type 2 fuzzy sets, that is, we turn the membership functions into fuzzy sets themselves. The problem is that this process is in fact ad infinitum, potentially resulting in type n (and, in principle, type ') fuzzy sets. This makes the manipulation of fuzzy sets and numbers opaque and reduces the tractability of these tools in dealing with ''real-life'' problems.
These problems notwithstanding, much improvement has occurred in the field of fuzzyset theory to make the approach more attractive in social sciences. In this article, I present one approach wherein the membership function does not play an important role, both theoretically and in the empirical tests. This is the approach of linguistic fuzzy sets that is based on the idea that it is possible to avoid dealing with the problems due to the arbitrariness of membership functions by not using them in the first place. This is done by going back to the very first step of fuzzy sets theory, which is to preserve the fuzziness of the empirical world using variables the values of which are ''words.''
Linguistic Fuzzy Sets
This section provides a brief introduction to the notion of linguistic variables. It ends with a discussion on how to aggregate information that is expressed in terms of linguistic variables. This is a crucial step of the process of decision making, as we need to be able to aggregate the various bits of ''linguistic'' information (that is expressed in linguistic format) on the issue at hand under the condition of fulfilling certain criteria. The following section then explicates how to model the decision-making process in various succeeding stages.
One way to avoid the above problems associated with using membership functions is to use linguistic variables instead of fuzzy numbers, that is, to use variables whose values are not numbers but words or sentences in a natural or artificial language. Since words are in general less precise than numbers, the concept of a linguistic variable serves the purpose of providing a means to approximately characterize phenomena that are complex or ill defined and hence not amenable to a crisp description in quantitative terms. Of course, in order for linguistic variables to be useful tools of analysis, one ought to be able to manipulate them through various operations. Generally, manipulating linguistic variables can be done in one of two ways. First, one can use linguistic variables by associating membership functions to them and then manipulating the membership functions, since linguistic variables are but a special category of fuzzy sets. Second, one can directly symbolically manipulate the linguistic variables themselves.
In the former case, the manipulation of linguistic variables is done through using the extension principle, which in essence allows the extension of usual algebraic and arithmetic manipulations to fuzzy sets. However, using extended arithmetic operations to handle fuzzy numbers increases the vagueness of results at every step of the calculation, and the shape of the membership functions is not preserved. The final results of this kind of method are fuzzy sets with membership functions that are often hard to interpret, thereby making the corresponding final linguistic variables outside the original set of linguistic terms that one starts from. In the second approach, based on using algebraic operations on the linguistic variables themselves, there is no need to manipulate any sort of membership functions at all. In the following, I summarize the contours of the symbolic approach. I illustrate the approach as I introduce it by discussing a hypothetical situation in which state leaders have to make choices on how to build a security alignment. This is a fictitious example, hence I do not attempt to justify the posited underlying substantive assumptions for why I chose certain variables.
Linguistic fuzzy analysis is mathematically rigorous, that is, it is built on a coherent mathematical framework of definitions, theorems, lemmas, and the like. A key idea behind this approach is to directly manipulate the available linguistic information and knowledge. In this pursuit, the first step is to choose the basic ingredients that are used in the symbolic manipulation. This means that the analyst has to choose a context-dependent linguistic terms set to describe vague or imprecise information. For example, a linguistic terms set for the linguistic variable Importance denoted by H(Importance), can be defined as H(Importance) ¼ fimportant, not important, very important, not very important, fairly importantg. Normally, in any one situation of decision under multiple criteria, one is faced with a number of linguistic variables, not just one. It is easier to opt for the same linguistic terms set to describe variation of the various linguistic concepts in the problem at hand, although this is not a requirement. The elements in the set will determine the level of distinction among different parts of the available information, called the granularity of uncertainty. Each value of the linguistic variables is characterized by a syntactic label and a semantic value or meaning. The label is a word or a sentence belonging to the chosen linguistic terms set. The meaning of the label is a fuzzy subset in a universe of discourse (a finite set of words and phrases). The choice of the linguistic terms set with its semantic is thus the first step of any linguistic approach to solving a problem. A linguistic variable is mathematically defined as follows:
. L is the name of the linguistic variable. H(L) denotes the term set of L, i.e., the set of names that provide the linguistic values of L, with each value being a fuzzy variable denoted generally by X and ranging across a universe of discourse U. G is a syntactic rule (which usually takes the form of a grammar) for generating the names of the values of L. M is a semantic rule for associating meanings M(L) to L, with M(L) being a subset of U.
This definition can practically be implemented by means of an ordered structure of linguistic terms. The semantic of these linguistic terms is hence derived from their own ordered structure, which may be symmetrically distributed on the interval [0, 1], but not necessarily so.
As an illustration I now introduce a hypothetical situation in which state leaders are seeking to form a security alignment. In order to do so they need to weigh a number of alternative forms of security alignments, taking into account a number of factors (or criteria). Let us assume that in order to choose a form of security alignment, state leaders have to simultaneously consider four factors: DDR, VUL, RPL, and RMT (see Table 1 for the meanings of these symbols). State leaders engage in a process of multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) in evaluating the merits of different alternatives among a set of possible security alignments.
I call these variables criteria following Zadeh (1970, p. B148) , who demonstrated that in a fuzzy-set approach ''concepts of goal and constraint . . . are defined as fuzzy sets in the space of alternatives and thus . . . can be treated identically in the formulation of a decision.'' The crisp separation between goals and constraints disappears, and the fuzzy goals and constraints are aggregated to a single function that is maximized. 7 This insight has been much elaborated on in the 30 years since then and is now widely accepted in the milieu of fuzzy-set theorists.
8 Along these lines, criteria and conditions are treated in the same way in my article. To make a long story short, whether we can call these criteria, conditions, or simply factors, what is important (and this is a value added of the fuzzy-set approach) is how they are aggregated to produce a result. The reason for this is that vagueness can never be eliminated from these and most human concepts, and this is precisely what the fuzzy-set approach is about; that is, how to model this vagueness and not force an artificial crispness on natural language. A fuzzy logic approach-instead of a Boolean logic approach-does not require, in fact discourages, seeking a sharp delineation between criteria and conditions. For example, the argument is that when practitioners are seeking to reach a decision on whether to conclude an alliance pact, they do not make a list of criteria and a second list of conditions and then treat them differently in their minds. Rather, the practitioners try their best to account for what they think are the most important factors influencing the issue at hand.
I thus posit that the state leaders need to choose among a set of four alternative options of security alignment fWBB, SBB, MUU, SCCg (see Table 1 for explanation of these symbols). They do this by combining the available linguistic information on the four factors fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg. A state leader who is interested in forming a security alignment with other states comparatively evaluates the four options by taking into account all four factors. Simon's (1996) statement, ''In the decision-making situations of real life, a course of action, to be acceptable, must satisfy a whole set of requirements, or constraints. Sometimes one of these requirements, or constraints, is singled out and referred to as the goal of the action. But the choice of one constraint from many is to a large extent arbitrary. For many purposes it is more meaningful to refer to the whole set of requirements as the (complex) goal of the action. This conclusion applies both to individual and organizational decision-making.'' 8 See, for example, Herrera and Herrera-Viedma (1998) .
The main idea of establishing the linguistic descriptors of a linguistic variable is to be able to delineate a few words by which the analyst (and practitioner) can naturally express the information. To this effect, one has to analyze the granularity of uncertainty-i.e., the level of discrimination among different delineations of uncertainty, also called cardinality of the linguistic terms set, used to express the information and analysis thereof. The cardinality of the terms set must be small enough so as not to impose useless precision on the users. Yet it ought to be rich enough to allow enough discrimination of the information being assessed. Typical values of cardinality used in the literature on linguistic models are odd ones, usually varying from 7 to 13. The mid-linguistic term usually represents an assessment of a statement such as ''approximately 0.5,'' with the rest of the terms being placed symmetrically around it (see Figs. 1 and 2 for examples of symmetrically and nonsymmetrically ordered sets). After establishing the cardinality of the linguistic terms set, one needs to provide a mechanism for generating the linguistic descriptors.
The approach, which is based on using an ordered structure of linguistic terms, consists of directly supplying the terms set by considering all terms as totally ordered on a scale. Using the example shown in Fig. 1 , a set of seven terms S could be given as:
This set is ordered in the sense that s a , s b if and only if a , b. 9 The subdomains (subintervals on Figs. 1 and 2) of the terms are given by fuzzy numbers defined on the interval [0, 1], with the fuzzy numbers described by means of membership functions. In this article I do not use these membership functions at any stage of the formulation of the linguistic fuzzy-set approach to decision making. Armed with this formalization of linguistic variables, we are now in a position to discuss how to account for the aggregation of linguistic information in the decision-making process.
Let us go back to the hypothetical example on security alignment. The variables fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg are considered as linguistic variables. We hence need a semantic set for expressing their variations. I choose the set of terms fNNN, LLL, LMM, MMM, MHH, HHH, VHHg, where
Thus, in an arrangement of weak bilateralism (WBB), I posit that the two states expect that the shared 
In this case, a subdomain may be more informative than the rest of the domain. The density of linguistic labels in that subdomain is greater than the density in the rest of the reference domain. 9 This kind of ordered set also satisfies the following three properties, which are important for formulating a rigorous mathematical manipulation of linguistic labels: (1) there is a negation operator, e.g., Neg(s i ) ¼ s j , where j ¼ T ÿ i (T þ 1 being the cardinality of the set); (2) there is a maximization operator defined as Max(
degree of diffuse reciprocity is low (DDR ¼ LLL). A low DDR creates a fear of high mutual vulnerability (VUL ¼ HHH). If there is a situation of power asymmetry, the strongest would then seek to use its power leverage to tilt the mutual security relation in its favor. That is, the strongest would readily rely very much on its power leverage (RPL) in defining and maintaining the arrangement. But this would mean that the two states would not rely much on mutual trust (RMT) in defining and maintaining the bilateral arrangement. In this situation we thus have RPL ¼ VHH and RMT ¼ LLL. Following the same type of reasoning, I posit Table 2 , which summarizes the linguistic values of the four factors fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg for each of the four possible choices of security arrangement. 10 Let me emphasize that a key aspect of Table 2 is not the absolute fuzzy values of the individual variables fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg for each of the security options fWBB, SBB, MUU, SCCg. Rather, what is hypothesized and yet to be demonstrated is that the aggregation of the values of these individual variables does indeed produce the posited security option. Hence, one ''hidden'' weakness of this analysis is that Table 2 is stated in comparative static terms. Yet the choice of security alignment is the result of the combined effects of all four variables, fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg.
A key question thus is: how can we aggregate the effects of the individual variables to check the validity of the results of comparative static analysis? One conventional way to do it is by estimating the value of each variable, let us say for weak bilateralism, and then estimate the overall costs and benefits that a state might incur were it to opt for such a security arrangement. The deciding state would also have to carry out the same costbenefit analysis for other forms of security alignment. The final choice on the form of security arrangement would then be the one that minimizes the overall costs and maximizes the overall benefits. The final choice for any state would be obtained by optimizing the estimate of the aggregated values of all four variables. Yet this approach is still underdetermining, for it does not explicitly address the above hidden weakness; it does not demonstrate explicitly the postulated simultaneous multiple causality.
In this article, I propose to use an LFSA framework to model how state leaders make the choices that they do. In doing this I am positing that the decision makers do not seek first to estimate the absolute costs and benefits of the independent variables and then only at the end compare the relative merits of the aggregated costs and aggregated benefits of all security arrangements. Rather, state leaders consider the relative merits of the security arrangement right from the beginning. For example, a state leader would examine how WBB fares on the dimension of strategic vulnerability when compared with multilateralism, and so on for all four variables fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg. Only at the end do state leaders consider the aggregated relative merits of different security arrangements. I believe that this is very realistic, because it does not require the analyst (or the policy maker) to estimate the absolute values of the independent variables. This is a crucial point, because the task of estimating the absolute values of variables is always fraught with methodological pitfalls and empirical hurdles that all students of IR and practitioners alike are well aware of. Not only must the full range of alternative security arrangements be specified and evaluated according to their relative merits; I also think it appropriate and realistic that we should deal with the independent variables in the same way. An LFSA framework allows us to do this using fuzzy comparison. In other words, I take it that the results displayed in Table 2 are not yet fully demonstrated-they have yet to simultaneously take into account the multiple criteria. This step is more often assumed implicitly by most scholars who engage in this kind of analysis. Demonstrating multiple causality is often not done, or in most cases is rather vaguely asserted. An LFSA approach does indeed provide one way to establish multiple causality (or lack thereof) in a formal and rigorous mathematical way using linguistic fuzzy analysis. More formally, 11 the LFSA analysis consists of asking a number of IF-THEN fuzzy questions to reach a conclusion about the combination of the different dimensions of causality. In the case of the running example we would have for WBB the following fuzzy
I use the Ó symbol instead of AND or OR because in LFSA multiple causality is neither strictly necessary (which is usually represented with a logical AND and symbolically by a product of the independent variables) nor strictly sufficient (which is usually represented with a logical OR and symbolically by an addition of the independent variables).
12 LFSA allows a formalization of fuzzy multiple causality as ''more or less necessarily like'' and ''more or less sufficiently like,'' usually termed as approximate reasoning. The outcome WBB is causally produced through the fuzzy rule IF-THEN to a certain extent, which is expressed by a linguistic variable. In conventional decision making and game theory, causality is usually treated using Boolean two-valued logic phrased formally as WBB ¼ DDR*VUL*RPL*RMT if, for example, all independent variables are considered to be necessary conditions. Alternatively, we could have WBB ¼ DDR*VUL*RPLþDDR*VUL*RMT if, for example, DDR, VUL, and RPL are jointly necessary conditions and DDR, VUL, and RMT are jointly necessary conditions (and a number of other possible combinations). If all four variables are sufficient conditions we can write in Boolean logic of causality IF DDR, VUL, RPL, RMT then WBB. For probabilistic causality this would take the form IF DDR, VUL, RPL, RMT then probably WBB. It is important to note that with fuzzy IF-THEN rules we are dealing with vague causality, not with probabilistic causality, that is, fuzzy causality means that WBB IS produced to a partial degree, 13 whereas probabilistic causality would mean that WBB IS produced OR NOT produced with a certain likelihood. Hence a key difference between LFSA decision making and conventional decision making (such as used in expected utility and game theoretic models) is that they are built on different notions of causality rooted in different logics.
14 The first task now is to establish how each of the four options fWBB, SBB, MUU, SCCg compares to one another according to each of the four variables fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg. These estimates are expressed linguistically and are relative, not absolute. To move 11 I thank one of the reviewers for encouraging me to follow this line of comparison.
12
See, for example, Goertz (2003a; 2003b, pp. 68-70) .
13
To put it in an awkward way: WBB IS ''a bit caused'' AND ''a bit not caused;'' that is, causality is partial.
14 See the author's forthcoming paper on linguistic fuzzy multiple causality. At a fundamental or logic level the difference is that LFSA deals with partial degrees of truth, whereas probabilistic causality still adheres to a Boolean notion of truth with a dichotomous choice between TRUE and FALSE (at least for most works published in social sciences).
further, we need to introduce a second semantic set that can be used to express how these security options perform compared to one another when taking into account the various criteria. I opt for the following set, which is big enough to allow a rich comparison of the four security options.
15
Each label corresponds to an index k, which is used for purposes of structurally ordering the labels in the set. The whole set corresponds to fp k jk ¼ 0,. . .,12g with each element of the set representing a preference relation. Table 3 is set up to provide dyadic comparisons of security options x i and x j . Using these semantics we obtain 14 different 4 3 4 matrices of performance relations, with each matrix corresponding to a linguistic value of one of the four criteria fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg. For example, for VUL ¼ VHH, I obtain the following matrix:
Elements 1, 2, 3, 4 of a row correspond to the order in the set fWBB, SBB, MUU, SCCg (and the same for column elements). This means that on the dimension of strategic vulnerability, we have the following preference relations between the four forms of security arrangement (ceteris paribus): When mutual vulnerability (VUL) is very high (VHH):
The remaining 13 matrices are listed in Appendix A. These matrices are derived from the assumptions made in Table 2 . I first take as starting points the linguistic values ascribed to the four variables fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg and, second, derive the comparison relations of the four options fWBB, SBB, MUU, SCCg for each of these linguistic values. For example, in the case of the matrix for VUL ¼ VHH displayed earlier, the WBB option is the more likely one to be chosen, that is, weak bilateralism is the most preferred security option, ceteris paribus. Yet state leaders know that vulnerability is only one of four criteria to be satisfied and therefore they must take into account the other criteria as well. Under such a constraint, state leaders would, for example, compare WBB with SCC and decide that under a condition of VUL ¼ VHH they would rank WBB as P 1 14 ¼ LPP compared to SCC (that is, WBB is preferred to SCC to a Low degree), ceteris paribus. Along the same lines, state leaders would rank SBB as about the same (P 1 24 ¼ AAS) as SCC, the reason being that under a condition of VUL ¼ VHH, SBB is closer to SCC than WBB on the dimension of VUL (as shown in Table 3 ), ceteris paribus. Again, these evaluations are expected to be rough estimates only. This is the essence of using a linguistic fuzzy approach to the problem of decision making-preserving a lack of precision is important. The remaining preference relations are obtained through a similar process of reasoning. As a second illustration of this procedure let us consider the case of the SNF (shortrange nuclear forces) decision that occurred within NATO in 1989, which Sanjian (1992) examined using a fuzzy-set approach. NATO faced four different options: X1-modernize SNF; X2-negotiate missile reduction with the Warsaw Treaty Organization; X3-modernize SNF and negotiate with WTO; X4-neither modernize nor negotiate by postponing the decision on SNF. The preferences ranking for the members of NATO (as deduced by Sanjian) are listed in Table 4 .
Using a method based on membership functions, Sanjian predicts that Germany's preference ordering is what NATO will most likely adopt, which indeed was the case, as the empirical evidence shows.
The NATO collective choice can alternatively be analyzed using the linguistic fuzzy approach. To this end, we need to recast the information in Table 4 in terms of a linguistic terms set and produce matrices of preference relations that compare for each state the various options as dyads. Although I could use the linguistic set introduced earlier, there is no need for such a high level of granularity, and I instead opt to use the reduced set of linguistic terms fHPP, MPP, LPP, AAS, LDD, MDD, HDDg (as defined in Table 5 ). This gives a total of 16 preference matrices.
Let us consider, for example, the German case for which Sanjian (1992) derives the following ordering of alternative options from best to worst option: X2 . X4 . X3 . X1. This is translated using linguistic preference relations as X2 is preferred to X1 in high degree (HPP); X2 is preferred to X3 in moderate degree (MPP); and X2 is preferred to X4 in low degree (LPP). Likewise, X4 is preferred to X1 in moderate degree (MPP); X4 is preferred to X3 in low degree (LPP); and X3 is preferred to X1 in low degree (LPP). This leads to the following matrix of comparative preferences for Germany: The row elements of this matrix correspond to the vector fX1, X2, X3, X4g, whereas the column elements correspond to the transposed vector fX1, X2, X3, X4g transpose . The matrix preferences for the other 15 states are obtained in a similar fashion. The remaining matrices are given by:
In order to reach a decision on what type of security arrangement is best for a state or to reach a collective decision in the NATO example, the information on dyadic preference relations has to be aggregated to be useful. The procedure for doing so is addressed next. 
Aggregating Linguistic Information
Several kinds of aggregation operators of linguistic information have been suggested in the literature. 16 They can be grouped in four broad categories: (1) aggregation operators of linguistic nonweighted information, (2) aggregation operators of linguistic weighted information, (3) aggregation operators of multigranularity linguistic information, and (4) aggregation operators of numeric and linguistic information. These operators differ according to the kind of information that is to be aggregated. Type (1) is used when the different pieces of linguistic information to be aggregated are all equally weighted in the process of decision analysis. Type (2) is most useful when some pieces of linguistic information are more important than others. Both types (1) and (2) are situations in which the granularity-semantic differentiation-of the various pieces of information is the same. Type (3) applies to situations in which different pieces of linguistic information have different semantics such as, for example, one having 7 terms in the linguistic terms set and the other having 13 terms. Although this is not a fundamental difficulty, it does make the manipulation of linguistic labels somewhat more demanding. Finally, type (4) is important in situations in which linguistic and quantitative pieces of information are combined in the decision-making process. Again, this does not pose a fundamental obstacle but does increase the number of steps that must be made in analyzing the decision process. In this article I explicate the second method for the sake of illustrating the fuzzy method of aggregating linguistic information.
Aggregation Operators of Linguistic Information
The aggregation of linguistic information under the requirement of satisfying a number of different criteria is done by using a linguistic ordered weighted averaging (LOWA) operator. Two essential steps in this aggregation are: first, an ordering to the linguistic labels and, second, a weighted convex combination of the labels two by two until we aggregate all labels together.
As an illustration of this procedure, suppose that we would like to aggregate the following four labels, fL, ML, H, VHg. This is a subset of a larger set S ¼ s 0 ;. . .;s 8 f g¼ VL; L; ML; FFML; FFMH; MH; H; VH f g :
First, we need to decide on the weights that we attach to each label in the combination. That is, we need to have four weights, i.e., a weighing vector W ¼ [.,.,.,.]. Below I explicate the procedure through which we can obtain these weights depending on the characteristics of the problem at hand. Let us assume for the sake of this illustration the weighting vector W ¼ [0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.1]. Because these are the weights for an ordered set, the first weight corresponds to the ''highest'' label in the linguistic set fL, ML, H, VHg, in this case VH, and so on. The convex combination (after ordering the set of labels) is thus symbolically written as: At this stage, we have yet to start the process of aggregation. The aggregation is done in two phases. First, we symbolically decompose È(L, ML, H, VH) into a convex combination of simpler aggregations of labels (that is, with a smaller number of labels to aggregate) until we reach the smallest convex combination, that is, a combination of two labels. 17 Second, we go backward and recompose until we reach a final unique label. This is done as follows.
We begin by decomposing C 4 as a convex combination of the highest label (in this case VH), which has a weight of 0.3, and the aggregation of the remaining labels with the remaining weight 0.7, that is, The sum for the new weights is 0.29 þ 0.57 þ 0.14 ¼ 1, as it should be for a convex combination. We next apply the same procedure to C 3 , thus getting The new weights 0.80 ¼ 0.57/(0.57 þ 0.14) as the new weight for ML; 0.20 ¼ 0.14/(.57 þ 0.14) as the new weight for L. We repeat the operation with C 2 , which leads to: At this stage we use the following rule for combining two labels:
17 A fundamental aspect of this operator is the reordering step; in particular, an aggregate A is not associated with a particular weight W but rather a weight is associated with a particular ordered position of the aggregate. 18 and È are used to signify different symbolic operations. 19 This procedure is possible because the LOWA operator can be shown to satisfy the three properties of increasing monotonicity, associativity, and commutativity. This implies that we can carry out the decomposition in a variety of different ways, which would all lead to the unique final result.
[x] is the integer part of x. Note that in the case of m ¼ 2 we have b 1 ¼ s j and b 2 ¼ s i . If w j ¼ 1 and w i ¼ 0 with i 6 ¼ j, "i, then the convex combination is defined as
We thus obtain for the above example Let S ¼ fs 1 ,. . .,s m g be a set of m labels to be aggregated. The LOWA operator, È, is defined as: (1) ,. . .,s r(m) g is an ordering of S in which s r(i) s r( j) for j i, with r being a permutation over the set of labels S.
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Symbolic methods might suffer a ''loss'' of information caused by the use of the round operator, which comes from the need to express the results in the initial expression domain, which is discrete and finite. This problem of loss of information can be corrected by using the so-called 2-tuple symbols (a, S) where S is a label such as H, VH, etc., and a 2[ÿ0.5, 0.5]. This procedure becomes important when [x]6 ¼x (i.e., x is not an integer number). In this case a ¼ x-[x] helps us decide which nearest label to choose. I do not use these finessing techniques in this article to avoid an additional burden on the reader. See for details.
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The LOWA operator possesses a number of properties that make the process of aggregation of linguistic information a rational one. These properties are unrestricted domain, unanimity or idempotence, positive association of social and individual values, independence of irrelevant alternatives, citizen sovereignty, and neutrality (Herrera et al. 1996) . C m is called the convex combination operator of m labels. In the case of m ¼ 2 it is defined by:
. .,w m g make LOWA an ''orand'' operator located somewhere between the AND and OR logical operations. In other words, LOWA has simultaneously a finite degree of ''orness'' and a finite degree of ''andness,'' defined by: Expressed in terms of fuzzy sets, the maximum operator (producing the highest linguistic label in the ordered set) corresponds to an intersection of the fuzzy sets of all linguistic labels, hence it picks up the smallest common set, which in this case will be the highest label. This produces a degree of orness of 1 and a degree of andness of 0. Conversely, expressed in terms of fuzzy sets, the minimum operator (producing the lowest linguistic label in the ordered set) corresponds to a union of the fuzzy sets of all linguistic labels, hence it picks up the largest common set, which in this case will be the lowest label-the lowest label is necessarily implied in all subsequent labels. 22 This produces a degree of orness of 0 and a degree of andness of 1. The average operator does not differentiate between all labels and so produces equal degrees of orness and andness, i.e., 0.5. Hence the LOWA operator with many of the weights near the top will be an orlike operator with orness(W) ! 0.5, while those operators with most of the weights at the bottom will be andlike operators with orness(W) 0.5.
To offer a more intuitive understanding of the LOWA operator and the role of the weighting factors, let me draw a parallel with an emerging body of literature on decision theory, namely, the poliheuristic method as developed by Alex Mintz and others (Mintz 1993 (Mintz , 1995 Mintz et al. 1994; Mintz and Geva 1997) . 23 Briefly, the poliheuristic approach posits five main characteristics of decision making. (1) Nonholistic search: The process of decision making derives not from ''evaluation and comparison of all alternatives across different dimensions'' but rather from the use of ''heuristic decision rules that do not require detailed and complicated comparisons of relevant alternatives, and adopts or rejects undesirable alternatives on the basis of one or a few criteria'' (Mintz and Geva 1997, p. 85) . (2) Dimension or criterion-based processing: In situations in which decision makers are faced with cognitive and/or environmental constraints, they tend to use a dimension or criterion-based process instead of an alternative-based approach for processing information (Redd 2004, p. 339) . (3) Noncompensatory decision rules: When decision makers are faced with multiple goals under constraints, they resort to a noncompensatory strategy that ''avoids alternatives that have radically different values in key goals because, to compensate for a low value, one needs a high one on other dimensions'' (Goertz 2004, p. 16) . Hence the approach emphasizes ''how leaders evaluate different alternatives in light of their multiple and often conflicting aims. This emphasis poses a sharp contrast with standard expected utility models that most often make assumptions about the form of the one-dimensional utility function'' (p. 15). (4) Satisficing behavior: Ambiguity, uncertainty, and cognitive and other constraints end the decisionmaking process not through maximization of options but rather when an acceptable alternative is found to satisfy a number of key criteria (Mintz and Geva 1997, pp. 86-87) . (5) Order-sensitive search: Most theories of decision making (based on some variants of expected utility theory) posit the invariance assumption, that is, regardless of how a decision task is framed with respect to the ordering and sequencing of dimensions and alternatives, the outcome should remain the same. The poliheuristic approach argues that the invariance assumption is violated because, as Mintz and Geva (p. 87) noted, ''the poliheuristic decisionmaking model implies that the choice of a particular alternative may depend on the order in which particular dimensions (diplomatic, economic, military, political) are invoked.'' In a nutshell, the LOWA method does exactly what the poliheuristic approach suggests, that is, LOWA offers one way to formally model the poliheuristic theory approach.
From a poliheuristic theory perspective the LFSA is nonholistic, aggregates information based on a limited set of criteria, allows a noncompensatory aggregation of the information on the various alternatives, is based on a satisficing strategy, and is order sensitive. Aspects (1) and (2) of the poliheuristic theory method are built in the LOWA operator as defined up above, whereas aspects (3), (4), and (5) are taken care of through the aggregation weights W. Different choices of W would allow different degrees of noncompensatory, satisficing, and sensitivity to ordering in the decision-making process. Hence it can be said that the weights W are in some sense a modeling and measure of these three aspects of the poliheuristic theory method. In this respect, the degree of andness (as defined earlier) would provide a measure of the degree of noncompensatoriness in decision making (while orness would measure the degree of compensatoriness). Moreover, as will be explained later, the LFSA also offers one way to model the two-stage procedure of decision making postulated by the poliheuristic theory method. Yet the LFSA is more general than the poliheuristic method because it can also formally model a decision-making process based on different assumptions concerning the five aspects of poliheuristic theory (1-5) discussed earlier. Determining the weights W differently formally models different methods of decision making, such as, for example, allowing for different degrees of compensatoriness.
Weights Determination
The LOWA aggregation of labels depends crucially on the weights vector W. Yager (1988) introduced entropy as a measure that indicates the degree to which W takes into account the various individual pieces of information (expressed by the linguistic labels). Entropy measures the uncertainty on the occurrence of a distribution of weights. Probability is traditionally used to measure the uncertainty that we have on a single event, whereas, in comparison, entropy measures the uncertainty on a collection of events. A highly concentrated distribution of weight has smaller entropy than a less concentrated distribution; the former distribution is more informative and it is easier to predict its outcomes. Entropy provides a measure of information uncertainty in the sense that it describes the difficulty of predicting an outcome of a random variable. 24 Entropy for a weighting vector W is defined as:
Entropy is an interesting quantity because it satisfies the so-called maximum entropy principle (MAXENT). The intuition behind the MAXENT is that the W that maximizes the entropy is a reasonable estimate of the true distribution when we lack any other type of information. The estimate will be altered if we receive new information. The result is that out of all possible estimates of the probability distributions that are consistent with the ''data,'' the MAXENT method picks the one that is most uninformative, that is, closest to a uniform distribution (Golan et al. 1996; Paris and Vencovskfi, 1996) . MAXENT thus stipulates that in the process of making inferences based on incomplete information, we should select the probability distribution function with maximum entropy value given the observed data (Jaynes 1982) . Hence the distribution function obtained using MAXENT provides the most conservative estimation of the unknown underlying distribution function. This choice singles out the most significant and least biased distribution and the one that best represents the true distribution (Jaynes 1957 (Jaynes , 1989 .
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As an example, imagine that you are to choose from a choice set the elements of which are not necessarily fair (i.e., a nonuniform distribution of choices) defined by throwing two nonfair dice. There are 11 possible outcomes, each outcome having unknown probabilities of occurrence. Even though you do not know the distribution of outcomes, it is better for you to bet on the number 7 as opposed to 2 or 12, since there are 6 combinations that produce 7 while there is only 1 for the other combinations. The bet on 7 is the maximum entropy bet because the combination 7 produces the maximum expected value (given the lack of prior information about the probabilities). Thus the probability distribution that maximizes the entropy is numerically identical with the frequency distribution that can be realized in the greatest number of ways. The MAXENT principle means that making parametric inferences based on incomplete information should be done by selecting the probability distribution function with the maximum entropy value given the observed data.
The MAXENT principle could also be interpreted as a criterion for selecting a probability model. As long as we are willing to view entropy as a suitable measure of uncertainty, the MAXENT principle allows us to select the distribution that contains the largest amount of uncertainty compatible with certain constraints. This is somewhat similar to the maximum likelihood principle with the important difference that in the case of MAXENT one does not have to a priori assume an analytical form for the distribution. The MAXENT principle is thus an important generalization of Laplace's principle of insufficient reason, which stipulates the uniform distribution in situations in which there is complete lack of knowledge about the events. MAXENT deals with partial information and so stipulates that we should choose the probabilities that maximize the uncertainty about the missing information.
In sum, using MAXENT in the aggregation process of linguistic fuzzy information is suitable since it falls well within the spirit of preserving as much vagueness and uncertainty as possible. When supplemented with the measure of orness we have a procedure that preserves the vagueness of the information used to reach a decision as well as the multidimensionality character of the decision-making process. Thus I combine the two measures-orness and entropy-to determine the weights at every level of orness using MAXENT by solving the following optimization problem: Maximize Subject to:
where x is the specified desired degree of orness.
An analytic solution to this optimization problem can be found using the Lagrange multiplier method (see Appendix B for a summary of the method). 26 The weights are found to be given by
h is the largest positive solution of the following equation:
For every degree of orness x we obtain a value of h that gives a weights vector W. For example, for n ¼ 3 and a desired degree of orness x ¼ 0.7, we obtain the following equation:
The positive solution of this equation is h ¼ 1.89, leading to w 1 ¼ 0.55; w 2 ¼ 0.30; w 3 ¼ 0.15 with an optimized entropy of E(W ) ¼ 0.97. Table 6 shows the solutions for a system with n ¼ 4 weights for various degrees of orness. At this stage I have introduced all elements that are needed to aggregate linguistic information subject to a number of criteria. The following section explicates how the decision-making process is modeled using the LOWA operator. Filev and Yager (1995) ; Fuller and Majlender (2001) .
Choosing the Best Alternative
The task is to choose the best alternative among a set of n linguistic options X ¼ fx 1 ,. . ., x n g according to m linguistic criteria C ¼ fc 1 ,. . .,c m g. The starting point is to evaluate the various options in X in comparative terms, that is, how an alternative performs in satisfying each of the multiple criteria compared to the other options. This process produces a set of performance relations matrices, P i , made up of performance relations, with a matrix per each criterion i. For m criteria we would have m (n 3 n) matrices fP 1 ,. . .,P m g of performance relations. The goal then consists of finding the best performance relations matrix. The latter is found by aggregating the linguistic information stored in the individual performance relation matrices through the LOWA operator introduced earlier according to the following two steps (Herrera et al. 1996) The actual process of choosing the best alternative is done through a process of linguistic dominance among a set of decision options in three steps (see Fig. 3 ).
1. For each matrix P k of linguistic preference relations according to criterion k, we use the LOWA operator with a specified weights vector W 1 (determined by using the MAXENT principle for a degree of orness x 1 ), denoted as È W 1 , to obtain the individual linguistic dominance degree of each alternative
. .,n; j 6 ¼ i) with k ¼ 1,. . .,m; and i ¼ 1,. . .,n. 2. For each alternative x i , we then evaluate the social linguistic dominance degree, SD i , using a second LOWA operator with a specified weights vector W 2 (determined by using the MAXENT principle for a degree of orness x 2 ), denoted as È W 2 , as
. .,n. 3. We obtain the set of alternatives that have maximum linguistic dominance degrees This method of choosing the best alternative is now illustrated in the running example on security alignment. I assume a degree of orness of 0.3 at the first step of aggregation (that is, individual linguistic dominance degree of each alternative) and a degree of orness of 0.5 at the second step of aggregation (that is, social linguistic dominance degree of each alternative). 27 A degree of orness of 0.3 can be said to correspond to a fuzzy degree of andness characterized as ''as many as possible.'' This means that the decision makers will be satisfied only if as many as possible of the four criteria are satisfied. This leads to a weights vector: w 11 ¼ 0.15; w 12 ¼ 0.30; w 13 ¼ 0.55 with a maximum entropy of E(W 1 ) ¼ 0.97.
As to the stage of social dominance process, I assume that the decision makers are basically interested in the average aggregate at this stage, that is, with a degree of orness ¼ 0.5 and a degree of andness ¼ 0.5, which would correspond to a weighting vector w 21 ¼ w 22 ¼ w 23 ¼ w 24 ¼ 0.25 and a maximum entropy of E(W 2 ) ¼ 1.38. All contributions are therefore equally weighed in the social dominance process. Going to Table 3, we obtain  Tables 7-10.   28 For the sake of illustration, let us consider only Table 10 . The 3rd,. . ., 6th columns correspond respectively to the four criteria fDDR, VUL, RPL, RMTg. The 3rd,. . ., 6th rows correspond respectively to the four security options fWBB, SBB, MUU, SCCg. Hence, on the first criterion, DDR ¼ VHH (very high degree of diffuse reciprocity), the option MUU is most preferred for the social degree of preference equal to MPP, which according to Table 3 ranks better than VHD, HDD, or AAS, whereas on the criterion of very high vulnerability (VUL ¼ VHH), options SBB, MUU, and SCC are equally preferred to the WBB option. As can be seen from the table, SCC fares better (that is, MPP) than all three other options on the remaining criteria of no reliance on power leverage (RPL ¼ NNN) and very high reliance on mutual trust (RMT ¼ VHH). Aggregating these individual pieces of linguistic information on preference relations among the four security options (that is, aggregating ID These tables are drawn from a larger table that includes all results for all possible combinations of the independent variables for all possible outcomes. The three-page table is available from the author on request. alignment, as shown in the last column of Table 10 . That is, VLP is higher than AAS, MDD, or VHD, according to Table 3 . In sum, a security community obtains when the degree of diffuse reciprocity is very high, the level of vulnerability is very high, the level of reliance on power leverage is null, and the level of reliance on mutual trust is very high.
A similar analysis when applied to the case of collective decision in NATO leads to Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C. The best alternative is determined as a function of the two degrees of orness x 1 and x 2 , which are varied between 0 and 1. Sanjian's (1992) fuzzy approach predicts that Germany's choice is the best alternative (which his reading of the historical event confirms). A linguistic fuzzy approach also predicts that the German choice is the best collective alternative for NATO, that is, the option ''NEGO.'' However, as Table C.1 shows, there is more to it than just this. Indeed, by taking into account the degrees of orness at the individual and social levels, all options-POST, NEGO, MONE, and MODE (that is, postpone decision, negotiate with WPA, modernize and negotiate with WPA, and modernize)-are possible depending on different degrees of orness x 1 and x 2 . Moreover, these options are preferred to different levels. For example, as shown in Table  C .2, the option MONE is preferred to an HDD degree for x 2 ¼ 0.05 and 0.05 x 1 0.35 and to MDD degree for x 2 ¼ 0.95 and 0.05 x 1 0.35.
LFSA and Social Choice Theory
The LFSA can also contribute to a linguistic-fuzzy form of social choice theory. Substituting groups for criteria in the formulation of the decision problem can transform practically all decision-making problems under multiple criteria into social choice problems, and vice versa. The similarity between aggregation procedures in social choice (Nurmi and Meskanen 2000) . Indeed, the alternatives play the role of the candidates, the criteria play the role of the voters, and the decision maker plays the role of the society. 29 A core problem in this literature pertains to aggregating opinions of individuals to form a collective opinion.
The LFSA opens up the possibility of paying more attention to imprecise preference relations and presents aggregation tools (based on LOWA and MAXENT) that can help explore the possibility of social choices. Voting is a typical example of collective decision making and hence a natural context for discussing social choice methods. The comparative study of voting procedures has produced a long list of properties or performance criteria that allow for systematic assessments of various voting procedures. These procedures are usually set to satisfy some criteria. The various procedures of aggregating the votes are evaluated by considering the choices allowed or prohibited by various criteria. The literature on voting is full of paradoxes that emerge due to various incompatibilities of intuitively plausible requirements regarding social choices. As an illustration, consider the 29 Since Arrow proved his impossibility theorem about half a century ago, many researchers have attempted to avoid his negative result by relaxing some of his original assumptions. In Arrow's framework, a society of k individuals seeks to decide among a set X of discrete alternatives with no additional mathematical structure. Each individual actor has a preference over X that consists of a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation over X. A social choice function gives a rule for aggregating any particular profile of individual preferences into a group preference. Allowing preferences of individuals and society or just those of society alone to be fuzzy shows that Arrow's result can, under certain conditions, be avoided using fuzzy preferences and employing a particularly weak version of transitivity among the many plausible definitions of transitivity that are available for fuzzy preferences (e.g., Dutta 1987), or reaffirmed if strong connectedness is assumed for a variety of weak preference factorizations, even if the transitivity condition is weakened to its absolute minimum (e.g., Richardson 1998), or with conditionally mixed results (Geslin et al. 2003) . Table 11 . For the sake of comparing with the LFSA let us first solve this voting problem using the Borda count procedure. Borda's rule asks voters to rank all the options, which are then weighted before aggregation. The higher an individual ranks a particular option, the more points that option will receive. An option is awarded one point for each competitor ranked below it in the voter's ranking. The option with the most total points is declared the winner. Hence we obtain the following Borda counts:
These counts can alternatively be written in a matrix form in the following way (these are the ''crisp'' analogous of the linguistic ones given below): The Borda count for an option is obtained by adding the elements of a raw for each voter. The total number of points assigned to any option is obtained by summing up the individual ones, which leads to
The deterministic Borda count procedure can be turned into a probabilistic Borda count by assigning to every option a probability defined as the Borda score relative to all other options using the average rule: Table 13 is taken from a larger table that lists all possibilities for the degrees of orness at the individual and social levels extending from 0.1 to 0.9. 30 In all other cases not shown in Table 13 there is no clear winner with CAND1, CAND2, and CAND3 ranked at the same level of preference in all cases. However, we see from Table 13 that CAND1 is always a winner, CAND4 is always a looser, and CAND2 and CAND3 are always at the second level. Note that the level of support for the winner (CAND1) generally increases with the degree of orness x 1 from MDD to LDD. There are two exceptions, though, where for x 1 ¼ 0.3 and x 2 ¼ 0.6 CAND1 is preferred to a degree AS, which is greater than both MDD and LDD. Note that CAND1 is a winner for only x 2 ¼ 0.1 except for the two values x 2 ¼ 0.3 and x 2 ¼ 0.6. In other words, there is a clear winner for most degrees of orness at the social level, except again for the two values of x 2 ¼ 0.3 and x 2 ¼ 0.6. Whether this is idiosyncratic or a manifestation of a more general result is not clear to me at the moment, but it is a question worthy of further exploration. In short, one can arguably state that the LFSA method can reproduce the results obtained through the literature on probabilistic voting in social choice theory (at least in the example considered in this article). I can thus venture to argue that the LFSA provides at least another method to study voting and social choice in addition to the existing rich literature. However, in order to establish the full extent of this claim, an axiomatic approach needs to be pursued based on fuzzy (multivalued) logic and not on classical Boolean (two-valued) logic. In this respect, it is worthwhile to emphasize that LFSA does more than just provide a new way of aggregating linguistic preferences because it is based on a non-Boolean logic, the consequences of which are yet to be thoroughly explored for the resolution of lingering dilemmas and paradoxes of social choice theory. This task is the focus of ongoing work.
6 Conclusion
In this article, I have proposed a linguistic fuzzy-set framework to analyze decisionmaking processes. Much scholarship has been produced on the issue area of decision making in IR and more generally in political science. Much has been achieved in this regard. I hope that this article will contribute to this body of literature by presenting 30 The larger table is available from the author upon request. 31 Ragin's (2000) and Goertz and Mahoney's (2004) explorations of causality using fuzzy logic are pointers in this direction. See also the author's forthcoming paper on linguistic fuzzy multiple causality. a framework that seeks to integrate interdisciplinary work from other fields of science into international studies. On the methodological front, I have attempted to show that formal modelers and quantitative researchers, on the one hand, and those using more qualitative methods, on the other hand, do not have to be at each others' throats. They can in fact join efforts to integrate what is best from different sides of the debates. Indeed, this article shows that highlighting the fuzziness of many of our social aspects of interaction does not have to be at the expense of rigor and good modeling. If engineering students are talking about ''computing with words,'' it is only befitting social scientists to seriously engage themselves in similar ventures. Formal modeling and mathematical rigor do not have to be at the expense of the richness and ''vagueness'' of what we call social and political phenomena.
On the empirical research front, every scholar who has been engaged in testing a theory or hypothesis, whether using quantitative or qualitative methods, understands well the difficulty of finding as well as using the right data, in the right way, for the right question, to reach the right conclusions. This is no easy task and no one can claim to have a final word of wisdom on it. This is part of the very richness of social sciences. In this regard, I hope that the ideas of using linguistic variables as explained in this article do provide us with another means of increasing the diversity and richness of deriving and testing our knowledge of ''what exists out there.'' This leads to a last issue, namely, the connection between the scholarly and policy worlds. Although there are many reasons why such a linkage does not always evolve in mutually beneficial ways, one impediment that seems to worsen the lack of communication is that the media used by scholars in their research are often very opaque to the practitioners. Conversely, scholars must often play the role of translators between the policy world and their theories about social and political reality. This process is, as we all know, fraught with many slippery turns. The linguistic formal method proposed in this article lends itself quite naturally to an effective means of communication between scholars and practitioners, since the approach greatly facilitates the exchange and analysis of ''raw'' linguistic information. Scholars, and especially their theories and hypotheses, can directly ''speak'' to the policy world and incorporate raw elements of the policy world in their theories and hypotheses. Carrying out such a research program will probably not be an easy task, but it is nonetheless worth pursuing.
Appendix C Table C .1 A fuzzy-set model of NATO decision making: The case of short-range nuclear forces in Europe. Best collective alternative. 
